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PREFACE 
The problem of how t o  make a "fair division" of resources among competing interests 
arises in many areas of application at IIASA. One of the tasks in the System and Decision 
Sciences Area is the syStematic investigation of different criteria of fairness and the  formu- 
lation of allocation procedures satisfying them. 
A particular problem of fair division having wide application in governmental decision- 
making is the apportionment problem. An application has recently arisen in the debate over 
how many seats in the European Parliament t o  allocate t o  the different member countries. 
Discussions swirled around particular numbers, over which agreement was difficult t o  achieve. 
A systematic approach that seeks t o  formulate principles or criteria of fair division should 
stand a better chance of acceptance in that it represents a scientific or system analytic ap- 
proach t o  the  problem. 

ABSTRACT 
A (generalized) Huntington method for apportioning representatives among states, 
or seats among parties, is one which distributes seats one by one by using a rank index that 
determines how deserving a state, or party, is to  receive the next available seat. A charac- 
terization of these methods is given by two basic properties: consistency and house mono- 
tonicity. 
The argurnenls used to  establish this result are combinatorial in nature and use classi- 
cal theorems concerning partial orders and their representation by a real-valued function. 

On Hunt ing ton  Methods of  Apport ionment  
INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF HISTORY 
The a p p o r t i o n m e n t  problem is  t h e  problem o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  how 
t o  d i v i d e  a  g i v e n  i n t e g e r  number of  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o r  d e l e g a t e s  
p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  among g i v e n  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  re- 
s p e c t i v e  s i z e s .  The problem a r i s e s  i n  d e c i d i n g  how t o  d i s t r i b u t e  
a  g i v e n  number of  d e l e g a t e s  i n  a  l e g i s l a t u r e  among t h e  component 
s t a t e s  of a  c o u n t r y  and a l s o  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  how t o  d i v i d e  a  g i v e n  
number o f  c a n d i d a t e s  among t h e  v a r i o u s  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  r e c e i v i n g  
v o t e s  i n  a n  e l e c t i o n .  I n  t h e  l a t t e r  g u i s e  t h i s  i s  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  problem.  
I n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  t h e  appor t ionment  problem h a s  a  l o n g  and 
i n t e r e s t i n g  h i s t o r y  stemming from t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  mandate ,  
" R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  and d i r e c t  t a x e s  s h a l l  be  a p p o r t i o n e d  among t h e  
s e v e r a l  S t a t e s  ... a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  numbers" ( A r t i c l e  
I ,  S e c t i o n  2 ) .  T h i s  s t i p u l a t i o n  l e d  t o  an e a r l y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  
v a r i o u s  methods by which appor t ionments  might  be  computed. 
J e f f e r s o n ,  Hamil ton,  and Webster a l l  a c t u a l l y  p roposed  methods,  
and many i m p o r t a n t  p o l i t i c a l  f i g u r e s  i n  Uni ted  S t a t e s  h i s t o r y  con- 
c e r n e d  themse lves  w i t h  t h e  appor t ionment  problem a t  r e g u l a r  t e n -  
y e a r  i n t e r v a l s  f o l l o w i n g  each  c e n s u s ,  t h u s  t e s t i f y i n g  b o t h  t o  i ts 
p o l i t i c a l  impor tance  and i t s  mathemat ica l  n o n t r i v i a l i t y .  (For  a n  
h i s t o r i c a l  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  problem i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  see [ 4 , 1 4 ] . )  
I n  Europe,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  appor t ionment  methods  d o e s  n o t  seem t o  
have  been d e b a t e d  u n t i l  t h e  second h a l f  o f  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  
and t h e n  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  ( s e e ,  e . g . ,  
[ 1 2 1 ) .  
Formal ly ,  t h e  appor t ionment  problem may b e  s t a t e d  a s  f o l l o w s .  
L e t  p = ( p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p s )  be  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n s  o f  s states, where e a c h  
pi > 0  i s  i n t e g e r ,  and l e t  h  ', 0 b e  t h e  number o f  s e a t s  i n  t h e  
house t o  b e  d i s t r i b u t e d .  The problem is  t o  f i n d ,  f o r  any p and 
a l l  house s i z e s  h  2 0,  an apportionment f o r  h:  an  s - t u p l e  o f  non- 
n e g a t i v e  i n t e g e r s  3 = ( a l ,  ..., a  ) whose sum i s  h .  A solution of 
s 
t h e  appor t ionment  p r o b 1 e m . i ~  a  f u n c t i o n  f which t o  e v e r y  P and h  
a s s o c i a t e s  a  unique appor t ionment  f o r  h ,  a i  = f i  ( p , h )  2 0 where 
C a .  = h .  A s p e c i f i c  appor t ionment  method may g i v e  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r -  
i ' 
e n t  s o l u t i o n s ,  f o r  " t i e s "  may o c c u r  when u s i n g  it-- f o r  example 
when two s t a t e s  have i d e n t i c a l  p o p u l a t i o n s  and must s h a r e  an  odd 
number o f  s e a t s .  I t  is  u s e f u l ,  f o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  t o  d e f i n e  an 
apportionment method M a s  a  non-empty set  o f  s o l u t i o n s .  Two d i f -  
- 
f e r e n t  appor t ionment  s o l u t i o n s  f  and g  o f  a  method M may b e  iden-  
- - - 
t i c a l  up t o  some house h  and t h e n  b r a n c h ,  depending  on how a  
p a r t i c u l a r  t i e  is  r e s o l v e d .  The r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  E t o  t h e  domain 
( p , h l ) ,  0 5 h '  5 h ,  w i l l  b e  c a l l e d  a  sollction up to h ,  f h ,  and f  
h  
w i l l  b e  c a l l e d  an extension of  f  . 
- 
A s  e a r l y  a s  1792 Thomas J e f f e r s o n  [ l o ]  , t h e n  S e c r e t a r y  o f  
S t a t e ,  p o i n t e d  t o  t h e  advan tages  o f  u s i n g  a  method o f  a p p o r t i o n -  
ment a f t e r  e a c h  c e n s u s ,  a s  opposed t o  r e l y i n g  on ad hoe p r o c e d u r e s  
which a r e  s u s c e p t i b l e  o f  e n d l e s s  p o l i t i c a l  argument and manipula- 
t i o n .  Moreover,  h e  proposed a  g e n e r a l  and i m p o r t a n t  method known 
t o d a y  a s  J e f f e r s o n ' s  method ( 2 )  [41. T h i s  method, l a t e r  r e d i s -  
covered  by t h e  B e l g i a n  mathemat ic ian  V i c t o r  d l H o n d t ,  h a s  been 
w i d e l y  used f o r  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  problem i n  Europe 
[121. The Uni ted  S t a t e s  appor t ionments  based  on t h e  c e n s u s e s  o f  
1790 t h r o u g h  1830 were J e f f e r s o n ' s .  
I n  1792 Alexander  Hamil ton,  t h e n  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y ,  
p roposed  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  method [ 7 ] .  Given t h e  p o p u l a t i o n s  ( p l  , p 2 ,  
. . . , p  s )  and h ,  f i r s t  compute t h e  e x a c t  q u o t a  f o r  e a c h  s t a t e  i ,  
p i h / ( C . p . )  = q i r  and c o n s i d e r  t h e  f r a c t i o n a l  remainders  di = q i -  1 3  
lqil (where 1x1 r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  l a r g e s t  i n t e g e r  less t h a n  o r  e q u a l  
t o  x )  a r r a n g e d  i n  descending  o r d e r ,  s a y  di ) di ) . - -  L- d .  . 
1 2  S 
Then H a m i Z t o n ' s  me thod  i s  t o  f i r s t  g i v e  e a c h  s t a t e  i lq i ]  s e a t s ,  
and i f  di  i s  among t h e  f i r s t  d  = C d .  terms o f  t h e  above l i s t  t h e n  
i 
it i s  g i v e n  one  more, o r  Lq.1 + 1  s e a t s .  T h i s  method was proposed 
a g a i n  a f t e r  t h e  1850 c e n s u s  by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Samuel F .  Vinton o f  
Ohio, and was used ( s u b j e c t  t o  p o l i t i c a l l y  m o t i v a t e d  amendments) 
f o r  t h e  c e n s u s e s  o f  1850 th rough  1900 under  t h e  name " V i n t o n ' s  
Method o f  1850 ." 
A s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h i s  method came t o  l i g h t  i n  1881 
when C.W. S e a t o n ,  t h e  Chie f  C l e r k  o f  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  Census 
O f f i c e ,  d i s c o v e r e d  t h a t ,  whereas  t h e  Hamilton method, i n  appor-  
t i o n i n g  299 s e a t s  among t h e  s t a t e s ,  gave  Alabama 8 ,  it g a v e  h e r  
o n l y  7  i n  a  house of 300 s e a t s .  T h i s  phenomenon (which i s  no 
i s o l a t e d  q u i r k  o f  t h e  Hamilton method b u t  i n  f a c t  o c c u r s  f r e q u e n t -  
l y )  was dubbed t h e  AZabama p a r a d o x ,  and was immedia te ly  r e c o g n i z e d  
a s  a  c r i t i c a l  f l a w  i n  t h e  Hamilton method. 
Beginning e a r l y  i n  t h i s  c e n t u r y  a t t e n t i o n  was t h e r e f o r e  f o -  
cused  on  d e v e l o p i n g  methods t h a t  do  n o t  admi t  t h e  Alabama paradox ,  
t h a t  i s ,  methods t h a t  a r e  h o u s e  mono tone  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  f ( p , h + l )  
- - 
> f  ( p , h )  f o r  e v e r y  p  and h.  W.F. Wi l lcox  [I71 g e n e r a l i z e d  an 
- 
- - - 
e a r l i e r  p r o p o s a l  o f  Webster [ I61 t o  o b t a i n  a  house monotone method, 
known a l t e r n a t e l y  a s  t h e  method o f  major  f r a c t i o n s  o r  W e b s t e r ' s  
me thod  ( W ) ,  which was used  i n  1911. T h i s  method was p roposed  
- 
independently by Sainte- ague in 1910 [I31 and has been used in 
proportional representation systems in Europe. Beginning at about 
this time E.V. Huntington [9], Professor of Mathematics at Harvard, 
undertook a formal investigation of house monotone methods. 
From a computational point of view Huntington's approach may 
be summarized as follows. Let r(p,a) be any real-valued function 
of two variables, called a rank i n d e x .  Then a house monotone 
apportionment method M is obtained by taking all apportionment 
- 
solutions f defined recursively as follows: 
- 
(ii) if a. = fi (p. ,h) is an bj-apportionment for h, and 
k is some one state for which r (pk,ak) 2 r (pi ,ai) 
for 1 ( i ( s, then 
fk(?,h+l) = ak + 1, and fi(plh+l) = ai for i f k. 
The method obtained in this way will be called the H u n t i n g t o n  
method b a s e d  on r(p,a), and as a class such methods will be called 
H7lntinaton me thods  (see [ 4 ] ) .  It is obvious that all Huntinqton 
methods are house monotone. But Huntington himself only consid- 
ered five particular choices of ranking function -- these are 
listed in Table 1. As an example of a Huntington method Table 2 
gives the Webster allocations (r(p,a) = p/(a+j)) for a house 
ranging from 5 to 17 seats. That the five methods discussed by 
Huntington are, in fact, all different is shown in Table 3 by the 
apportionments obtained for a house of 36 seats for the same six- 
state example as that of Table 2. 
T a b l e  1.  The f i v e  me thods  o f  ~ u n t i n g t o n .  
bye= Pank Index Test of l n ~ q u a l l t y  (p . /a  ) 1 1 - 1  I 
smallcst Divlsors (9 iv'a a]  - al  [ijl.,'pl) 
I.lebster (W) p/(a+1/2) a,/pj - al/pl 
(a l so  Gown as Major 
Fractions and Salnte- 
UgCle ) 
Jefferson (2) p/ (a+l )  a j  (pi/p - ai 
(a l so  known a s  Greatest I 
Dlvisors o r  dlHondt) 
T a b l e  2. Sample Webs te r  a p p o r t i o n m e n t s .  
I A B C D E F 
Sta tePopula t ion  
House Size  
i 
27,744 25,178 19,947 14,614 9,225 3,292 
2 1 1 1 0 0 
Table  3 .  
Apportionment fo r  36 
Party Votes Received Exact Quota SD HM EP W J 
- - -  - - 
A 27,744 9.988 10 10 10 10 11 
Hunt ing ton  d e r i v e d  t h e s e  f i v e  p a r t i c u l a r  methods from c e r t a i n  
binary-comparison " t e s t s  o f  Ynequa l i ty . "  Given an  appor t ionment  
a  = ( a l  , a 2  , .. . , a s )  f o r  h  and p o p u l a t i o n s  p  = ( p l  , p 2  , .. . , ps )  , con- 
- - 
s i d e r  any p a i r  o f  s t a t e s  i ,  j  and t h e  numbers pi/ai  and p . / a .  
I I f  
which r e p r e s e n t  t h e  a v e r a g e  d i s t r i c t  s i z e s  i n  s t a t e s  i and j  re- 
s p e c t i v e l y .  Hunt ington t h e n  a rgued :  "Now i n  a  p e r f e c t  a p p o r t i o n -  
ment,  t h e s e  two numbers would be e x a c t l y  e q u a l  ... hence ,  i n  any 
p r a c t i c a l  c a s e , . . .  i f  [ t h e ]  i n e q u a l i t y  can b e  reduced  by a  t r a n s -  
f e r  of a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  from one s t a t e  t o  t h e  o t h e r  t h e n . .  . t h e  
t r a n s f e r  s h o u l d  be made .... The q u e s t i o n  t h e n  comes down t o  t h i s :  
what  s h a l l  b e  meant by t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  between t h e s e  two numbers?" 
[9 ,  p.  861. Hunt ington t h e n  g o e s  on t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  a b s o l u t e  
d i f f e r e n c e ,  IPi /a i -  p j / a j l  , v e r s u s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e ,  
I pi/ai - P j / a  I 
min t p i / a i , p j / a j l  ' 
Assume t h a t  i and j  a r e  chosen  s o  t h a t  pi/ai 2 p j / a j ;  t h e n  
t h e  r e l a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  p . a . / p . a .  - 1 .  Suppose t h e  r e l a t i v e  
1 1  1 1  
d i f f e r e n c e  i s  chosen a s  t h e  " r i g h t "  measure  o f  i n e q u a l i t y .  Then 
it i s  e a s i l y  shown t h a t  a  = ( a l ,  ..., a  ) i s  a n  appor t ionment  s u c h  
- s 
t h a t  n o  t r a n s f e r  can  be  made between two s t a t e s  t h a t  r e d u c e s  t h e  
amount o f  i n e q u a l i t y  i f  and o n l y  i f ,  f o r  a l l  i and j ,  
which h o l d s  i f  and o n l y  i f  ( a l  , a 2  , . . . , a s )  i s  o b t a i n e d  a s  a  
I 
Hunt ing ton  method s o l u t i o n  w i t h  r ( p , a )  = p / { a ( a + l ) } i ,  t h a t  i s ,  EP - 
[ 4 ]  . S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  t e s t  pi/ai - p  . / a .  l e a d s  t o  t h e  Harmonic Mean 3 3 
method. On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  one c o u l d  j u s t  a s  w e l l  b e g i n  by com- 
p a r i n g  t h e  numbers a  . / p j  and ai/pi , o r  a .  and a i  ( p  . / p i )  o r  a .  (pi/  
I  3 I  3 
p  . ) and a i l  whose d i f f e r e n c e s  l e a d  t o  W, SD, and J r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  3 - - 
and whose r e l a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e s  a l l  r e s u l t  i n  EP [91 . I t  i s  i n t e r -  
- 
e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  t h a t  H u n t i n g t o n ' s  a p p r o a c h  t o  J was 
- 
q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  f rom J e f f e r s o n ' s ;  moreover  Hunt ing ton  was a p p a r e n t -  
l y  n o t  aware o f  J e f f e r s o n ' s  p r o p o s a l .  
H u n t i n g t o n ' s  g o a l  was t o  show t h a t  EP is  t h e  b e s t  o f  t h e  f i v e  
- 
methods ,  b e c a u s e  it i s  b a s e d  on what he f e l t  was t h e  most  n a t u r a l  
measure  o f  d i f f e r e n c e - - n a m e l y ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e .  I n  t h i s  
h e  was s u p p o r t e d  by two s e l e c t  commi t tees  which r e p o r t e d  t o  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Academy o f  S c i e n c e s ,  one  i n  1929 [ 5 ]  and 
one  i n  1948 [ I l l .  These  r e p o r t s  b o t h  a r g u e d  f o r  EP b e c a u s e ,  o f  
- 
t h e  "now known" methods which a r e  "unambiguous" and  house mono- 
t o n e ,  EP s a t i s f i e s  a  t e s t  t h a t  seems t o  be  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  o t h e r s  
- 
and  y i e l d s  a p p o r t i o n m e n t s  t h a t  a r e  " n e u t r a l  ... w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
emphas i s  on l a r g e r  and s m a l l e r  s t a t e s "  [ 5 ] .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  
house monotone methods based  on r a n k  i n d i c e s  o t h e r  t h a n  
H u n t i n g t o n ' s  f i v e  had a p p a r e n t l y  escaped  o b s e r v a t i o n .  
THE TWO BASIC PROPERTIES 
By h i s  t e s t s  of i n e q u a l i t y  Hunt ing ton  r e s t r i c t e d  t h e  f i e l d  
t o  f i v e  p a r t i c u l a r  methods,  b u t  d i d  n o t  c o n v i n c i n g l y  s i n g l e  o u t  
any one  method a s  u n e q u i v o c a l l y  " b e s t . "  Here we a s k ,  what a r e  
t h e  e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  c l a s s  o f  Hunt ing ton  
methods from a l l  o t h e r s ?  The answer  i s  s u r p r i s i n g l y  s i m p l e .  
The f i r s t  b a s i c  p r o p e r t y  o f  Hunt ing ton  methods -- house  mono- 
t o n i c i t y  -- h a s  a l r e a d y  been ment ioned :  i t  was, i n d e e d ,  t h e  fun-  
d a m e n t a l  m o t i v a t i o n  f o r  t h e s e  methods.  But t h e  Hunt ing ton  methods 
a r e  n o t  t h e  o n l y  house  monotone methods -- f o r  example t h e  Quota  
Method i s  a  house  monotone method t h a t  i s  n o t  a  ~ u n t i n g t o n  
method [ I ,  41 . 
A  f u r t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  house  m o n o t o n i c i t y  r e v e a l s  a  s e c -  
ond b a s i c  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  w e  c a l l  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  c o n s i s t e n c y .  I f  
M i s  any house  monotone method, and  f is  a  s o l u t i o n  o f  M ,  t h e n  
- - - 
f o r  any  g i v e n  p o p u l a t i o n s  p  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  f  c a n  b e  f u l l y  de-  
w - 
s c r i b e d  by s p e c i f y i n g ,  f o r  e a c h  h ,  which s t a t e  g e t s  t h e  " n e x t "  
( i . e . ,  ( h + l l s t )  s e a t .  F o r  i n  g o i n g  from f ( p , h )  t o  f ( p , h + l ) ,  
e x a c t l y  one  s t a t e  must g e t  one  more s e a t  w h i l e  a l l  t h e  o t h e r s  s t a y  
t h e  same. Why d o e s  some s t a t e  i, h a v i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  pi  and c u r -  
r e n t  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  a i  = f  ( e l  h )  , g e t  t h e  ( h + l )  s' s e a t  i n s t e a d  o f  
some o t h e r  s t a t e  j  w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n  p  and a p p o r t i o n m e n t  a  = j  j  
f j  ( p , h ) ?  E v i d e n t l y  because  s t a t e  i " d e s e r v e s "  it more t h a n  j .  
I n  comparing t h e  r e l a t i v e  c l a i m s  t o  an  e x t r a  s e a t  between any 
two  s t a t e s  i and j ,  t h e  o n l y  r e l e v a n t  d a t a  s h o u l d  b e  t h e i r  pop- 
u l a t i o n s  pi and p  and t h e i r  c u r r e n t  numbers o f  s e a t s  a i  and a  j' j' 
That  i s ,  M d e f i n e s  a  p a r t i a l  r e l a t i o n  > on t h e  set X of  p a i r s  o f  
- -. 
i n t e g e r s  ( p , a ) ,  p  > 0,  a  > 0,  a s  f o l l o w s :  
- 
( p , a )  2 ( q , b )  i f  and o n l y  i f  t h e r e  i s  some p ,  h  
- 
and some i ,  j such  t h a t  pi = p ,  p j  = q ,  f i ( p , h )  = a ,  
f . ( p , h )  = b  and f i ( p , h + l )  = a  + 1, f . ( p , h + l )  = b .  
3 - - 3 - 
I n  t h i s  c a s e  we s a y  ( p , a )  h a s  weak p r i o r i t y  o v e r  ( q , b ) .  
I t  s h o u l d  be n o t e d  t h a t  i f  ( p , a )  ( q , b )  by some M t h e n  t h i s  
i m p l i e s  t h e r e  i s  a  problem w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n s  p  = ( . . . , p , . . . , q , . . . )  
- 
and some h  a t  which M g i v e s  a  s e a t s  t o  t h e  s t a t e  w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n  
p  and b  s e a t s  t o  t h e  s t a t e  w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n  q .  I f  ( p , a )  ( q , b )  
and n o t  ( q , b )  ? ( p , a )  we w r i t e  ( p , a )  > ( q , b )  , whereas  i f  ( p , a )  2 
( q , b )  and ( q , b )  2 ( p , a )  w e  w r i t e  ( p , a )  - ( q , b )  and  s a y  ( p , a )  and 
( q , b )  a r e  t i e d .  
I t  i s  n a t u r a l ,  from t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  appor t ionment  i t s e l f ,  t o  
r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n  2 s a t i s f y :  
i f  ( p , a )  and ( q , b )  a r e  t i e d ,  t h e n  M s h o u l d  be 
- 
" i n d i f f e r e n t "  between them; t h a t  i s ,  whenever 
f o r  some p  and  h ,  f i  ( p , h )  = a ,  f .  ( p , h )  = b r  
." - 3 - 
pi = p  and p  = q ,  i f  f  g i v e s  t h e  (h+l  ) st s e a t  
- 
t o  s t a t e  i t h e n  t h e r e  s h o u l d  b e  an a l t e r n a t e  
s o l u t i o n  g ~  M t h a t  i s  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  _f up t o  h  
( i . e .  gh = _fh)  , b u t  t h a t  g i v e s  t h e  ( h + l )  s t  
s e a t  i n s t e a d  t o  s t a t e  j .  
Any method M having  p r o p e r t y  ( 2 )  w i l l  be s a i d  t o  b e  c o n s i s -  
." 
t e n t .  B a s i c a l l y ,  c o n s i s t e n c y  means t h a t  i f  ( p , a )  - ( q , b )  , t h e n  
any two s t a t e s  w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n s  p  and q  and a p p o r t i o n m e n t s  a  and 
b  a r e  e q u a l l y  d e s e r v i n g  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  method 
M .  
- 
Of c o u r s e ,  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  v e r y  n a t u r a l  p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  we 
might  wish  t h e  p r i o r i t y  r e l a t i o n  t o  s a t i s f y ,  e . g . ,  t r a n s i t i v i t y .  
Remarkably enough,  however,  it t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  something s u f f i -  
c i e n t l y  c l o s e  t o  t r a n s i t i v i t y - -  namely,  a c y c l i c i t y  -- i s  i m p l i e d  
by t h e  two c o n d i t i o n s  o f  house m o n o t o n i c i t y  and c o n s i s t e n c y .  
Indeed ,  t h e s e  two p r o p e r t i e s  p r e c i s e l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  c l a s s  of  
Hunt ing ton  methods.  
THE CHARACTERIZATION 
Theorem.  An a p p o r t i o n m e n t  method M i s  h o u s e  monotone  and 
c o n s i s t e n t  i f  and o n l y  i f  i t  i s  a H u n t i n g t o n  me thod .  
The proof  o f  t h i s  theorem n e e d s  two key lemmas c o n c e r n i n g  
t h e  r e l a t i o n  k. The f i r s t ,  which c o n t a i n s  t h e  meat o f  t h e  
argument ,  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n .  
Lemma 1 .  L e t  t be t h e  p r i o r i t y  r e l a t i o n  o f  a  house monotone 
and c o n s i s t e n t  appor t ionment  method M. I f  ( p ,  , a l  t . .  . Z  ( p k , a k )  
t h e n  n o t  ( p k , a k )  ' ( p l , a l ) .  
R e c a l l  t h a t  i f  T i s  any b i n a r y  r e l a t i o n  on some s e t  S ,  t h e n  
t t h e  t r a n s i t i v e  c l o s u r e  o f  T ,  T , i s  d e f i n e d  by ( x , y )  E nt i f  and 
1  1 2  m 
o n l y  i f  ( x , x  1 ,  ( x  , x  ) ,... , ( x  , y )  a r e  a l l  i n  T f o r  some sequence  
1 2  m 
x , X  , . . . ,x E S. C l e a r l y  vt i s  a lways  t r a n s i t i v e ;  and vt i s  
i r r e f l e x i v e  and t r a n s i t i v e  i f  v  i s  i r r e f l e x i v e  and a c y c l i c .  
L e t  s be  t h e  t r a n s i t i v e  c l o s u r e  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n  - i n  Lemma 
1  ; t h e n  a i s  symmetr ic  and t r a n s i t i v e .  D e f i n e  ( p , a )  = ( p , a )  f o r  
a l l  p a i r s  ( p , a )  E X ,  SO t h a t  -- i s  a n  e q u i v a l e n c e  r e l a t i o n .  L e t  
- 
X = X / =  be  t h e  q u o t i e n t  s e t  o f  X by = .  Now d e f i n e  t h e  b i n a r y  
r e l a t i o n  p on X x TI by ( y , z )  E p  i f  and o n l y  i f  ( p , a )  > ( q , b )  f o r  
some , ( p ,  a )  E y  and some ( q ,  b )  E z .  
W e  c l a i m  t h a t  p i s  a c y c l i c .  I f  n o t ,  t h e n  t h e r e  i s  a  sequence  
1 2  1  y  , y  , .. . l y k ~  TI, k 1 2 ,  such  t h a t  ( y  , y 2 )  E p ,  ( y 2 , y 3 )  E p , - .  ., 
k  1  ( y  , y  ) E p. Hence t h e r e  a r e  e q u i v a l e n c e  c l a s s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
( p i r a i l  E yi and (q i lb i )  E yi such  t h a t  
i i i i 
= (q  , b  ) f o r  e a c h  i ,  1  2 i 5 k ,  s o  t h a t  e i t h e r  ( p  , a  ) = 
i i i i (q i ,b i )  o r  else t h e r e  i s  a  c h a i n  i n  X such  t h a t  ( p  , a  ) = (p,  , a l )  
-...," i i i i ( p n r a n )  = ( q  , b  ) .  From t h e s e  and ( 3 )  we immedia te ly  de- 
r i v e  a  c h a i n  t h a t  c o n t r a d i c t s  Lemma 1 .  Hence p  i s  a c y c l i c ,  and 
i n  p a r t i c u l a r  asymmetric and i r r e f l e x i v e .  
L e t  pt be  t h e  t r a n s i t i v e  c l o s u r e  of  p ;  pt i s  t h e n  a  s t r ic t  
p a r t i a l  o r d e r  on X. W e  now need 
Lemma 2 .  I f  n  i s  a  s t r i c t  p a r t i a l  o r d e r  on a  c o u n t a b l e  set 
S ,  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  r e a l - v a l u e d ;  o r d e r - p r e s e r v i n g  f u n c t i o n  $:  
S + R ;  t h a t  i s ,  ( x , y )  E I T  i f  and o n l y  i f  $ ( x )  > $ ( y ) .  
P r o o f .  F i r s t  w e  show t h a t  IT i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  a  complete  o r d e r  
1 2  IT* on S.  L e t  x  , x  ,... b e  a  cor respondence  o f  S  w i t h  t h e  p o s i t i v e  
i '  i n t e g e r s ,  and l e t  Z b e  t h e  set  o f  a l l  o r d e r e d  p a i r s  ( x  , x J )  , where 
2  i < j  and x i , x j  E S. Z i s  a l s o  c o u n t a b l e .  L e t  z1 , z  ,. .. b e  a  
i '  
cor respondence  between Z and t h e  p o s i t i v e  i n t e g e r s .  L e t  ( x  lxJ  ) = 
a i '  
z  b e  t h e  f i r s t  i n  t h i s  sequence  such t h a t  n e i t h e r  ( x  , x J )  E IT n o r  
a  ( x j , x i )  E IT.  ( I f  t h e r e  i s  no such z  , IT i t s e l f  i s  comple te . )  
a  S i n c e  IT i s  t r a n s i t i v e ,  I T U { ~  } i s  a c y c l i c ,  hence a 1  = ( a ~ { z ~ ~ ) ~  i s  
2  
a  p a r t i a l  o r d e r  c o n t a i n i n g  IT .  Beginning w i t h  a ' ,  c o n s t r u c t  a  , 
m 
i 
and s o  f o r t h .  Then U IT = IT* i s  a  comple te  o r d e r  c o n t a i n i n g  IT. 
i= I 
k  
By i n d u c t i o n  on k d e f i n e ,  f o r  each  k  2 1 ,  a  f u n c t i o n  I$ : 
2 
. . 
k k  i k  j  {x '  , x  , . . . , x  ) + IR such  t h a t  4 ( x  ) > 4 (x ) i f  and on ly  i f  (x1,x7)  
k+l i k  i 
E n * ,  and such  t h a t  I$ ( x  ) = 4 ( x  ) when 1  5 i 5 k .  The union 
of a l l  t h e s e  I$k's is  t h e  d e s i r e d  4 : S - R .  
Tha t  n is con t a ined  i n  a  complete  o r d e r  i s  a  s p e c i a l  c a s e  of  
a  r e s u l t  known a s  S z p i l r a j n ' s  Theorem (which S z p i l r a j n  a t t r i b u t e s  
t o  Banach, Kuratowski and T a r s k i  [ 1 5 ] ) .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  r e a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  a  complete  o r d e r  on a  c o u n t a b l e  s e t  i s  a  s p e c i a l  
c a s e  o f  a  r e s u l t  of Debreu 161. 
The proof of  t h e  theorem i s  now completed a s  f o l l ows .  S ince  
- 
t h e  set  X of a l l  p a i r s  ( p , a )  i s  coun t ab l e ,  X = X/= i s  a l s o  count-  
- 
a b l e .  L e t  I$ : X + R  be  an o r de r - p r e s e r v ing  f u n c t i o n  r e l a t i v e  t o  P t 
as  gua ran t eed  by Lemma 2.  From w e  t h e n  d e f i n e  r :  X + R  such  t h a t  
r ( p , a )  = 4 (y) i f  and on ly  i f  y  i s  t h e  equ iva l ence  c l a s s  of  = con- 
t a i n i n g  (p, a ]  . 
W e  c l a i m  t h a t  M, t h e  house monotone, c o n s i s t e n t  method o f  
. 
Lemma 1 ,  i s  t h e  Huntington method based on r ( p , a ) .  Indeed l e t  
f  E M .  For any p suppose t h e r e  i s  a  f i r s t  h  such t h a t  f ( p , h )  = 
- .  - - 
( a l , a 2 , . . . , a s )  is  a  Huntington appor t ionment  f o r  h  (based  on r )  
b u t  f ( p , h + l l  is  n o t .  Then t h e r e  must be d i s t i n c t  s t a t e s  i and j  
. - 
such t h a t  r (p i ,  a i )  , a . )  b u t  f g i v e s  s t a t e  j  t h e  ( h + l )  st  > r ( p j  ] 
s e a t .  Thus ( p j  , a j )  I z ( p i t a i ) ;  b u t  by t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of r ,  w e  would 
have r (p j ,  a .  ) 1 r (pi , a i )  , a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  Thus e v e r y  !-solution I 
i s  a l s o  a  Huntington s o l u t i o n .  The converse  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  s i m -  
i l a r l y .  
T h i s  comple tes  t h e  proof  o f  t h e  theorem and l e a v e s  o n l y  t h e  
proof  o f  Lemma 1 .  
ESTABLISHING ACYCLICITY 
I n  e f f e c t ,  g i v e n  a  sequence  ( p l  , a l )  2 ( p 2  , a 2 )  2.. .-> ( p k , a k )  
what  we would l i k e  t o  d o  is  c o n s t r u c t  a  s o l u t i o n  f such  t h a t  f o r  
1  ( i 2 k ,  f i  ( ( p l  ,. ., , p k )  , h )  = a i  where h  = L a . .  T h i s  t u r n s  o u t  1 1  
t o  be  t e c h n i c a l l y  q u i t e  i n v o l v e d .  A  p a r t i c u l a r  s t u m b l i n g  b l o c k  
i s  t h a t  2 i s  o n l y  a  p a r t i a l  r e l a t i o n ,  s o  t h a t  n o t  e v e r y  two p a i r s  
( p ,  a )  and ( q , b )  a r e  comparable .  
L e t  u s  s a y  t h a t  a  sequence  S  = ( ( p l  , a l  ) , ( p 2  a 2 )  . . . r (pk t a k )  ) 
i s  c o n s t r u c t i b l e ,  w r i t t e n  C  ( (pl  , a l  , ( p 2  , a 2 )  ,. . - ( p k r a k )  t if t h e r e  
e x i s t s  f  E. M such  t h a t ,  f o r  some q = ( q l , .  . . , q s ) ,  S > k ,  s a t i s f y i n g  
- 
- - - qi - P 1 , q i  - P 2 ,  ... ,qi  - pk and some h ,  we have  f ( q ,  h )  = a .  
I 2  k  j "  I 
f o r  1 5 j 5 k .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  i f  S  i s  c o n s t r u c t i b l e ,  t h e n  it i s  
c o n s t r u c t i b l e  f o r  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  v e c t o r  ( p l r p 2 ,  . . . , p  k )  s i n c e  con- 
s i s t e n c y  p e r m i t s  one t o  i m i t a t e  t h e  s o l u t i o n  f o r  q  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  
- 
t h e s e  p o p u l a t i o n s .  A l s o ,  i f  it i s  known t h a t  ( p  , a )  2 ( q ,  b )  by 
some M t h e n ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  we have  C ( ( p ,  a )  , ( q ,  b)  ) . 
- 
Suppose t h a t  C  ( ( p , a )  , ( q ,  b )  ) , and  l e t  f E M ,  p  and h  be  such  
- - -  
t h a t  pi = p ,  f i  ( p ,  h )  = a  and p j  = q ,  f  . ( p ,  h )  = b. C o n s i d e r  t h e  
- 7 - 
sequence  o f  p a i r s  ( f i  (p ,O)  , f .  ( p , O ) ) ,  ( f i t  ( p , l ) ,  ( f j  ( p ,  1)  , . . . , ( f i  1 -  
( p ,  h )  , f  ( p ,  h )  ) -- t h a t  i s ,  t h e  r e c o r d  o f  how s t a t e s  i and j went  
- - 
from z e r o  s e a t s  e a c h  t o  an a p p o r t i o n m e n t  o f  a  and b  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
A f t e r  e l i m i n a t i n g  redundan t  e l e m e n t s  from t h i s  s e q u e n c e  w e  o b t a i n  
t h e  h i s t o r y  H ( a , b )  f o r  p ,  q .  E v i d e n t l y ,  s i n c e  f_  i s  house  monotone, 
any e l e m e n t  ( x l  , x 2 )  E H ( a , b )  s a t i s f i e s  o 5 x l  5 a ,  0  5 x2  5 b ,  and 
i f  ( x l  , x 2 )  f ( a , b )  t h e  s u c c e s s o r  o f  (x ,  , x 2 )  i s  e i t h e r  ( x l + l  , x 2 )  
o r  ( x 1 , x 2 + 1 ) .  Note t h a t  i f  ( x l + l , x 2 )  f o l l o w s  ( x l  , x 2 )  t h e n  ( p , x l )  
5 ( q , x 2 )  and if ( x l , x 2 + 1 )  f o l l o w s  ( x l  , x 2 )  t h e n  ( q f x 2 )  2 ( p t x l ) .  
W e  r e p r e s e n t  H ( a , b )  by a  t a b l e a u  o f  form: 
Any sequence S  = ( (pi , a i  ) ,... , (pi a i  ) ) such t h a t  (pi  r ai  ) 
1 1  k k  1 1  
t. (pi , a i  ) t.. . ?  (pi , ai  ) L (pi , ai ) i s  c a l l e d  a  cycle, and S 
2  2  k k  1 1  
i s  a  strict cyc l e  i f  a t  l e a s t  one of t h e  r e l a t i o n s  5 i s  s a t i s f i e d  
a s  > . 
The proof of Lemma 1  now proceeds by s e v e r a l  sublemrnas. 
Throughout,  t h e  r e l a t i o n  2 i s  t h a t  g iven  t o  u s  by t h e  method M. 
Lemma la. No s t r i c t  c y c l e  i s  c o n s t r u c t i b l e .  
Proof. Suppose t h a t  ( p l  , a l )  2 ( p 2 , a 2 )  h.. > ( p k , a k )  2 ( p l  , a l )  
i s  a  s t r i c t  cyc l e  and c o n s t r u c t i b l e .  Then f o r  some f E M we would 
have ai  = f i ( p l ,  . . . , p k ,  h )  where h  = Cia Let  i be  such t h a t  i '  
f i ( ( p l , .  . . , pk )  , h + l )  = ai  + 1. Then ( p i t a i )  , ai- ) whereas 
by assumption ( p i - l , a i - l )  ( p i t a i ) ,  hence ( p i t a i )  " ( p i - l ~ a i - 1 )  
( i f  i = 1  l e t  i - 1  always mean k ) .  The re fo re ,  by cons i s t ency  
s t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an ex t ens ion  g  of f h  such t h a t  g g i v e s  t h e  ( h + l )  
s e a t  t o  s t a t e  i - 1 .  Continuing i n  t h i s  manner we e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  
p i i  - p i l , a i 1 )  1  5 i k.  But t h i s  c o n t r a d i c t s  t h e  as -  
sumption t h a t  f o r  some i ,  (pi- l  l a i - l )  > ( p i r a i ) .  Hence S i s  no t  
c o n s t r u c t i b l e .  
Z Lemma l b .  I f  ( p , a )  - ( q , b )  then C ( ( q , b ) ,  ( q , b )  1 .  
h Proof. Since  ( p , a )  - (q ,b )  we must have C ( ( p ,  a )  , ( q , b )  ) . 
Let  H(a ,b)  be a p a r t i c u l a r  h i s t o r y  f o r  p  , q.  Define p = 
( p r q r q l .  Consider  t h e  largest house h  5 a  + b  + b  = h0 f o r  which 
t h e r e  e x i s t s  an !-apportionment x = (x1 ,x2 ,x3 )  s a t i s f y i n g  
(4) x l l a  , x 2 2 b  , x 3 2 b  I 
( 5 )  ( x l  , x 2 )  E H ( a , b )  and ( x l  , x 3 )  E. H ( a , b )  - 
Without  l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y  t a k e  x3 2 x2 .  
Case 1 .  x3 7 x2 .  Then H ( a r b )  h a s  form 
I n  p a r t i c u l a r  ( x l , x 2 + 1 )  E H ( a , b )  s o  
I f  a l s o  ( q , x 2 )  5 ( q , x 3 ) ,  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an appor t ionment  f o r  
h+ 1  
and s i n c e  x2 < x3 2 b ,  ( 4 )  and ( 5 )  a r e  s a t i s f i e d  f o r  t h e  l a r g e r  
house h + l ,  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  
Otherwise  ( q r x 3 )  > ( q , x 2 )  , s o  by Lemma l a  
Case l a .  I£ also x3 < b, then (xlrx3+l) E H(al,a2) and 
is an M-apportionment for h+l satisfying (4) and (5), a contra- 
diction. 
Hence x = b. We cannot also have xl < a, because then the 3 
history H(a,b) would imply that (xl+l rb) E H (arb) , so that (prxl) 
2 (qrx3) = (q,b) contrary to (7). 
Case I b .  x3 = b and xl = a. Then we have (q,x2) 3 (p,a) by 
(6) and (p,a) 2 (q,b) by the hypothesis of the lemma, so 
is an apportionment for h+l satisfying (4) and (5), a contradiction. 
Case 2 .  x3 = x2. If xl < a and x2 = x3 < b, then the suc- 
cessor of (x1,x2) in the history H(a,b) determines whether state 
1 or state 2 gets the (h+llst seat and in either case (4) and (5) 
are satisfied, a contradiction. If xl < a and x2 = x3 = b then 
(pIxl) (q,b) by the history and (xl+l ,b,b) is an ;-apportionment 
for h+l satisfying (4) and (5), again a contradiction. Finally, 
if x1 = a and x2 = x3 < b then (a,x2+l,x2) is an ;-apportionment 
for h+l satisfying (41 and (5), which is a contradiction once again. 
I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  we must have h  = a+b+b, p rov ing  t h e  lemma. 
Lemma I c .  I f  C ( ( q , b ) , ( q , b ) )  t h e n  f o r  any b ' ,  0  5 b 1  5 br  
< bk = b  such  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  sequence b '  = bo 5 b l  '...- 
C ( (q ,bi- , )  , ( q r b i )  ) f o r  1  5 i 5 k  and (q ,bo)  ( q , b l )  -> . . . 3 ( q , b k ) .  
P r o o f .  The proof  is  by i n d u c t i o n  on b  - b ' ,  t h e  r e s u l t  f o r  
b  = b '  b e i n g  t r i v i a l .  L e t  ~ ( b , b )  b e  any h i s t o r y  f o r  q ,  q .  Then 
t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  p a i r  ( x , y )  E ~ ( b , b )  such  t h a t  x  = b '  o r  y  = b l .  
Choose any  such  p a i r  ( x , y )  w i t h  x  + y  maximum. Say w i t h o u t  l o s s  
o f  g e n e r a l i t y  t h a t  x  = b ' .  Then by c h o i c e  of  ( x , y ) ,  y  > b '  and 
( q , b t )  5 ( q , y ) .  S e t  b l  = y .  I f  b l  = b  we a r e  done; o t h e r w i s e  
b, < b and we a r g u e  a s  w i t h  b '  t o  f i n d  a  b2  > b l  s u c h  t h a t  ( q , b l )  
? ( q , b 2 )  and s o  f o r t h .  T h i s  comple tes  t h e  p roof  o f  Lemma I c .  
F o r  any sequence  S  o f  p a i r s  (pi ,a i  , (pi , a i  ) , .. . , (pi  , a i  ) 
1 1  2  2  k k  
d e f i n e  bS t o  b e  t h e  maximum of  t h e  i n t e g e r s  a i  , 1  2 j 5 k ,  and 
i 
J 
d e f i n e  nS t o  be t h e  number o f  a i  such  t h a t  a i  = bS. W e  s a y  t h a t  
j j 
sequence S  p r e c e d e s  T, w r i t t e n  S  < <  T  i f  e i t h e r  bS < bT o r  bS = bT 
and nS < nT. 
C l e a r l y  any sequence  o t h e r  t h a n  a  t r i v i a l  one o f  form S  = 
( (p ,O)  ) h a s  a  p r e d e c e s s o r .  
Suppose, c o n t r a r y  t o  Lemma 1 ,  t h a t  ( p l  , a l )  . . . 2 ( p k , a k )  2 
( p l , a l )  is  a  str ict  c y c l e  S. By Lemma l a  S  i s  n o t  c o n s t r u c t i b l e ,  
hence i n  p a r t i c u l a r  bS > 0 .  W e  may t h e r e f o r e  assume i n d u c t i v e l y  
t h a t  S  i s  t h e  " f i r s t "  s t r i c t  c y c l e ;  i . e .  t h a t  T  < <  S  f o r  no s t r i c t  
c y c l e  T. Also ,  we may assume (by r e l a b e l l i n g  i f  n e c e s s a r y )  t h a t  
a 2  = bS. W e  s h a l l  now d e r i v e  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  
For  e a c h  i ,  1  2 i k-1, t h e  f a c t  t h a t  (pi  , a i )  5 (pi+l  , a i + l )  
i m p l i e s  C ( ( p i , a i )  , ( ~ ~ + ~ , a ~ + ~ ) ) ;  hence f o r  e a c h  s u c h  i choose a  
h i s t o r y  H(a i , a i+ l )  f o r  p . ,  p  i+ l .  ~ e t t i n g  p = ( p l  1 p 2 , -  - . , p k )  and 
h0 = zi ai , 0 consider the l a r g e s t  h' 5 h for which there exists 
$ E M satisfying 
(fi(plh),fi+l (plh)) ~ H ( a ~ , a ~ + ~ )  for all i, 
(8) 
1' i z k - 1  and all h ' h' . 
0 Clearly h' exists and h' 2 0. Moreover, if h' = h then S 
is constructible, a contradiction. Therefore, h' < hO. Let x. = 
1 
fi (~,h'l for each i; in particular, by (8) we have xi 5 ai. Let 
V be the set of all pairs (pi,xi), 1 5 i k. Any two elements 
of V are comparable relative 'to 3 because V has actually been con- 
structed; for the same reason there are no strict cycles in V. 
Second, define E = I (pi ,xi) E V : xi = ail. 
We now construct a p a r t i a l  relation R on V as follows: for 
1 5 i 5 k-l if (x irxi+l) (ai,ai+l) and the successor of ( X ~ , X ~ + ~ )  
in H (ai,ai+, ) is (xi+l ,xi+l ) then (pi,xi) R (pi+l whereas if 
the successor is ( ~ ~ , x ~ + ~ + l )  then (pi+l ) R (pi ,xi) . These are 
all the relations in R. The significance of R is the following: 
if (pitxi) E V - E  is undominated relative to R then the successive 
pairs from the sequence (~~,x~,...,x.+1,x~+~,...,x ) are again k 
members of the histories H (al ,a2) , .. . ,H (ak-l ,ak) . 
Notice that vRw implies v w for any V,WE V. Further, com- 
parable pairs under R form a forest (in fact, a forest in which no 
vertex has degree greater than two) on the vertex set V. Since, 
by definition, we never have (pitxi) R (p ,x ) for any (pitxi) E E j j 
it follows that the set of R-undominated elements in V -  E is non- 
empty. Let vR = {vEV-E: not w R v  for any W E V }  f a .  
Finally, let v* = (pe,xp) be a maximum element of vR rela- 
tive to 2 .  Notice that v* cannot also be maximum in V relative 
to k, for if it were then by consistency there would exist an M- 
- 
apport ionment  f o r  h l + l  g iv ing  t h e  Ch'+l)s t  s e a t  t o  s t a t e  R .  More- 
ove r ,  t h i s  would ag ree  w i th  t h e  g iven  h i s t o r i e s ,  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  
o u r  assumption on h ' .  
We c l a im  
For any wo E V - E t h e r e  i s  a  c h a i n  W ~ X W ~ - ~ . .  .Rwo i n  
R V-E such t h a t  wn E V , hence v* ): wn 2 ... >wo. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  E  
cannot  be empty, e l s e  v* would be maximum i n  V. Suppose ( 9 )  i s  
f a l s e ,  and l e t  Cpirxi) = ( p .  , a i )  be any element of E .  ~ i r s t ,  i f  
i f 1 ,  l e t  j  be t h e  l a r g e s t  index  Zess t han  i such t h a t  (p  , x j )  ,e! E. j  
(Such a  j  always e x i s t s  by t h e  assumption t h a t  ( 9 )  i s  f a l s e . )  
Then ( x j r a j + l )  E H(a j  , a j + l  1 ,  hence ( p j  , x j  2 ( P ~ + ~  , a j + l  . Moreover, 
by assumption on S ,  Cpj+l , a j + l  ) > ( p j + 2 , a j + 2 )  t . . . 2 ( p i r a i l .  But 
(pj  , x j )  , ( p j + l  a j + l )  . . . , (pi , a i )  ha s  been c o n s t r u c t e d ,  s o  by Lemma 
l a  it cannot  be a  s t r i c t  c y c l e .  Hence ( p j , x j )  2 ( p i r a i l .  
Second, i f  i = 1  then  ( p 2 , a 2 )  @ E  imp l i e s  ( a l  , x2 )  E H(al  , a 2 )  s o  
(p2 ,x2 )  2 ( p l  , a l ) .  S ince  i n  t h e  above argument ( p i r x . )  was a r b i -  
t r a r y  i n  El it fo l lows  t h a t  f o r  a l l  (p i ra i )  E E  t h e r e  e x i s t s  (p  j  
x . ) ,e! E such t h a t  ( p j  , x j  ) ): (pi , a i )  . But t hen  v* would be maximum 3 
i n  V ,  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  Thus (9 )  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  
S ince  v* = ( p R , x R )  cannot  be maximum i n  V, bu t  v* wo f o r  
a l l  W ~ E V - E ,  t h e r e  must e x i s t  W E E ,  say w = ( p j  , a  ) , such t h a t  
w > v*. Suppose t h a t  j  > R .  Observe t h a t  s i n c e  (pRel  l aR- l  t 
(pi ,  a & )  , Lemma 1  b  t e l l s  us t h a t  C (p t  , a R ;  p R ,  a t ) .  Hence, by Lemma 
1  2  I c ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  sequence xt = a R  a t ' .  . . 2 a; = a t  such t h a t  
1 2  2  (P  , a  ? CpR,aR) ' . . . (pR.a;). Then ( p j  , a j  R R ) (pRlaL)  ( p R I a R )  
? . . . ( p a )  ? (pRtl 2 . . . 2 ( p j  , a . )  is a  s t r i c t  c y c l e  T  3 
t h a t  does not i nc lude  t h e  p a i r  ( p 2 , a 2 ) ,  hence does n o t  c o n t a i n  a s  
many v a l u e s  bs a s  d i d  t h e  o r i g i n a l  c y c l e  S.  S i n c e  a 2  was chosen 
t o  b e  t h e  maximum v a l u e  o f  a i  i n  S ,  T  <<  S ,  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  i n -  
d u c t i v e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  no  s t r i c t  c y c l e  p r e c e d e s  S. 
Suppose, t h e n ,  t h a t  j  < R .  L e t  t be t h e  l a r g e s t  i n d e x  less 
t h a n  j  ( i f  such  e x i s t s )  such  t h a t  xt  < a t .  Then ( ~ ~ , a ~ + ~ )  E H ( a t r  
a  ) s i n c e  x  t +  1  t+l  = a  and s o  ( p t r x t )  ( P ~ + ~  r a t + l  t + l  ) 2 . . . 2 ( p j  , a j )  
> ( p R r x R ) .  S i n c e  t h i s  sequence h a s  been c o n s t r u c t e d  w e  have 
( p t r x t l  > ( p R r x R ) .  But t h i s  i m p l i e s  v* = ( p R , x R )  is  n o t  a  maximum 
i n  V - E, a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  So xi = a i  f o r  1  2 i 5 j  , and ( p l  , a l  ) 
(p, a 2 )  > . . . 2 ( p j  , a j  ) > ( p R  , x i )  . But t h i s  sequence  h a s  been con- 
s t r u c t e d  s o  (pl  , a l  ) > ( p R , x R ) .  Thus,  a s  b e f o r e ,  ( p l  , a l )  . (pi  , x i )  = 
1  n  (p,,a,) 2 .. . ? ( p  , a  = ( p  a  2 r a R + l  R R R '  R 15 ... Z ( p k , a k )  5 ( p l  
a l )  i s  a  s t r i c t  c y c l e  T  ( n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n s t r u c t e d )  w i t h  T  <<  S. 
T h i s  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  c o n c l u d e s  t h e  proof  o f  Lemma 1  and hence o f  t h e  
theorem.  0 
FURTHER AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATIONS 
T h i s  p a p e r  h a s  shown how t h e  f i v e  methods d i s c u s s e d  by 
Hunt ing ton  f i n d  t h e i r  p l a c e  i n  an  a x i o m a t i c  s e t t i n g  which unique-  
l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  t h e  c l a s s  of " g e n e r a l i z e d "  Hunt ing ton  methods by 
two b a s i c  p r o p e r t i e s :  house m o n o t o n i c i t y  and c o n s i s t e n c y .  
P a r t i c u l a r  Hunt ington methods may be u n i q u e l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
by v a r i o u s  a d d i t i o n a l  axioms. A method M i s  s a i d  t o  be t h e  u n i q u e  
- 
one s a t i s f y i n g  g i v e n  p r o p e r t i e s  i f  any o t h e r  set  M '  of  s o l u t i o n s  
- 
having  t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s  i s  a  set  o f  M-so lu t ions ,  i . e .  M '  M.  
- - - 
One o f  t h e  fundamental  t y p e s  o f  axioms n o t  c o n s i d e r e d  by 
Hunt ington i s  t h a t  an  appor t ionment  should  n o t  d i f f e r  from t h e  
e x a c t  q u o t a s  by one whole i n t e g e r  o r  more. A method i s  s a i d  t o  
s a t i s f y  q u o t a  i f  any appor t ionment  ( a l  , a 2 , . . .  , a s )  f o r  ( p l  , p 2 , . .  . , 
ps)  a t  house h  h a s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  [q i J  2 ai 5 [qil  where qi i s  
t h e  e x a c t  q u o t a  o f  s t a t e  i. A method i s  s a i d  t o  s a t i s f y  upper  
q u o t a  i f  ai  2 [qil  f o r  a l l  appor t ionments  a i  and t o  s a t i s f y  lower  
q u o t a  i f  a i  2 lq iJ  . It may t h e n  be  shown t h a t  J ( J e f f e r s o n )  i s  t h e  
- 
unique  house  monotone, c o n s i s t e n t  method s a t i s f y i n g  lower  q u o t a  [ 3 ] .  
Also ,  SD ( S m a l l e s t  D i v i s o r s )  i s  t h e  un ique  house  monotone, c o n s i s -  
-, 
t e n t  method s a t i s f y i n g  upper  q u o t a  [ 3 ] .  S i n c e  SD and J a r e  n o t  t h e  
- 
same method (e .g .  s e e  T a b l e  2 )  it f o l l o w s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h a t  
t h e r e  is no house monotone, c o n s i s t e n t  method s a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a .  
I n  view o f  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  house m o n o t o n i c i t y  and s a t i s -  
f y i n g  q u o t a  a s  p r o p e r t i e s  of  a n  appor t ionment  method, it is  n a t u r a l  
t o  a s k  whe ther  t h e r e  e x i s t s  any  method t h a t  obeys  b o t h  p r o p e r t i e s .  
There  is; moreover ,  i f  c o n s i s t e n c y  i s  weakened t o  " c o n s i s t e n c y  
S a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a , "  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a unique  method, t h e  Q u o t a  
method, s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  t h r e e  p r o p e r t i e s  [ I ,  41 . 
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